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I n the 1990s, "results-oriented government" took off as a new way of holding government accountable for how it spends public money and, in particular, for the outcomes or results it produces. Th e new tools and public management reforms advanced refl ected an intentional shift from an emphasis on rules-or compliance-oriented accountability toward a focus on performance, or how well an organization does what it does in relation to its organizational goals (Heinrich 2003; Radin 2000) . Although prior administrations initiated reforms promoting accountability for results, pay for performance, and performance-based contracting, the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, spearheaded by Vice President Al Gore (and drawing on the infl uential work of Osborne and Gaebler 1992) , transformed these themes and principles into a movement to improve government performance, complete with reinvention teams (internal and governmentwide), reinvention laboratories within agencies, town hall meetings and reinvention summits, and new legislation to mandate performance management at the federal level (Kamensky 1999 ). 1 Th e fi rst major fruit of these eff orts was the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), enacted in 1993 to generate more objective information on government performance and effi ciency by measuring progress toward performance goals, providing evidence of performance relative to targets, and holding federal agencies accountable for results in annual reports to the public. In the decade and a half since passage of the GPRA, few dispute that there has been a defi nitive transformation in federal government capacity and infrastructure for managing for results, that is, in its use of outcome-oriented strategic plans, performance measures, and reporting of results (GAO 2008 ). Yet some in-depth assessments of the implementation of the GPRA also have been highly critical. Several researchers have suggested that overlaying a results-oriented managerial logic on top of an inherently political process in which agency goals may be ambiguous or contradictory sets the stage for inevitable problems in implementation, above and beyond the challenges of identifying adequate measures of performance (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Radin 2000 Radin , 2006 . Radin (2000) argued that rather than freeing public managers to focus on results, the GPRA's performance requirements exacerbated administrative constraints and confl ict among program managers and heightened distrust between agencies and legislators.
One of the primary goals of the George W. Bush administration in introducing the Program How Credible Is the Evidence, and Does It Matter? An Analysis of the Program Assessment Rating Tool research that has compared the GPRA and PART along a number of dimensions points to trade-off s between an approach that engages political actors from both the executive and legislative branches in a broader process of reviewing performance information and setting agency goals and expectations for performance, and a performance assessment tool that emphasizes rigorous, systematic, and objectively measured outcomes with consequences for resource allocations (Moynihan 2008; Radin 2006) . As Breul (2007) conveyed, PART was distinct from the GPRA in that it rendered a judgment, including "results not demonstrated."
Th is research focuses on the implementation and use of information produced by the PART, but with the intent to consider and inform the wider context and ongoing development of federal performance management eff orts.
More specifi cally, a central objective of this research is to assess the quality of evidence that agencies provided to the OMB in the PART assessments and to empirically examine relationships between attributes of the evidence and the PART ratings assigned. It is expected, in accord with OMB intentions under the Bush administration, that programs that used more rigorous methods of evaluation and produced better documentation of their results achieved higher overall and program results ratings. Th e empirical analysis focuses on the evidence submitted by 95 programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for the PART assessment, using newly constructed measures of the quality of evidence and methods used by the programs. Secondarily, this study also explores the relationship between the quality and rigor of evidence provided in PART assessments (and assigned performance ratings) and funding received by programs.
Th e Barack Obama administration progressively is developing its own initiatives to revamp federal performance management eff orts and replace PART. At the request of the OMB director, federal agencies have identifi ed a limited number of high-priority, missionoriented performance goals for which performance trends will be tracked. In addition, through the new Open Government initiative, the Obama administration intends to make high-quality data available to the public and to promote the use of new methods and technologies in analysis of performance data. It also is expected that the Obama administration will retain the focus on program evaluation that was central to PART, with more of the burden for evaluation likely directed at the agencies and away from OMB budget examiners (Newcomer 2010) . Th ese developments suggest that questions about the quality and rigor of the data and evidence supplied by the agencies (and to the public) will continue to be of central importance.
Th e following section of this paper reviews the research and information on PART to date, along with related literature on performance management and evidence-based policy making. Th e study data, research methods, and research hypotheses are described in the next section, followed by a presentation of the study fi ndings. Th e paper concludes with a discussion of the fi ndings and their implications for improving ongoing federal performance management eff orts and Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in 2002 was to strengthen the process for assessing public program eff ectiveness and holding agencies accountable for results by making it more rigorous, systematic, and transparent. As stated in an early policy memo, "A program whose managers fail year after year to put in place measures to test its performance ultimately fails the test just as surely as the program that is demonstrably falling short of success."
2 Th e shift in PART to a focus on assessing the performance of specifi c programs, rather than agencies, refl ected the aim for a more "evaluative" approach. Th e PART questionnaire administered by the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) asked 25 standard questions in each of four topic areas to rate federal programs, with additional questions tailored to particular program types (e.g., competitive grants, block/formula grants, regulatory programs, etc.). Th e fi rst set of PART questions addressed a program's purpose and design, essentially asking whether the government should be doing this activity (or operating this program) at all, which led to some objections that PART encroached on congressional authority (Radin 2006) . Th e second section on strategic planning expanded on the GPRA in assessing whether the agency set appropriate annual and long-term goals for programs. Th e third section rated program management, including fi nancial oversight and program improvement eff orts. And the fourth set of questions, the hallmark of PART, was intended to formalize the review of evidence on program performance, with higher standards for accuracy and expectations for longer-term evaluation. Th e burden of proof was placed explicitly on the programs to justify a positive ("yes") rating with a superior standard of evidence. In addition, the emphasis on results was reinforced by the weighting of the sections, with accountability for results (the fourth section) contributing 50 percent to the calculation of the overall PART score.
In rating program eff ectiveness, the OMB accepted historical performance data, GPRA strategic plans, annual performance plans and reports, fi nancial statements, and inspectors general's reports, but it also allegedly accorded higher ratings to programs that documented their eff ectiveness through randomized controlled trials, quasiexperimental methods, and/or longer-term, systematic tracking of outcomes. In fact, recommendations coming from early PART assessments were focused primarily on how program assessment methods could be improved to generate better data on performance rather than improving program performance itself (GAO 2005) .
Th e Bush administration also conveyed (in an executive directive) that a "credible evidence-based rating tool" would ensure that federal programs receive taxpayer dollars only when they prove that they achieve results. Unless the use of performance information was linked directly to budgeting activities that drive policy development, argued the OMB, performance management activities would continue to have little impact on policy making and program results (Moynihan 2008) .
While both the GPRA and PART aspired to move beyond "counting beans" in using data to make policy and management decisions,
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the fl ow of information that federal agencies have been generating in response to reporting requirements (Breul 2007) . PART aimed to elevate both evaluative capacity and expectations for the rigor and quality of information produced by agencies, as well as to give some "teeth" to compliance eff orts by attaching budgetary consequences to performance ratings (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006) .
In his analysis of the institutional politics associated with budgetary and performance management reforms, Dull questioned this latter provision of PART, asking why the president would expend limited resources on an initiative such as PART, given the dismal record of past initiatives, but also because, if implemented as designed, it would bind the president to "a 'transparent' and 'neutral' instrument that would presumably raise the cost of making political decisions" (2006, 188) . In eff ect, the administration would tie its hands (politically) in committing to a transparent process of making budget allocations in a neutral manner based on objective program performance evaluations. As Dull pointed out, this approach is inconsistent with other Bush administration actions that politicized scientifi c advisory committees, peer review standards for scientifi c evidence, and other information gathering for policy decision making.
Th e implementation of PART as a tool for mechanically tying budget allocations to program results is also inconsistent with the conception of the budgetary process, described some time ago by Wildavsky (1964) , as an expression of the political system. As Wildavsky articulated, a budget simultaneously may be viewed (by diverse stakeholders) as having many diff erent purposes-for example, as a set of goals or aspirations with price tags attached, as a tool for increasing effi ciency, or as an instrument for achieving coordination or discipline (among other things). Budgeting is also inevitably constrained by shortages of time and information, by reenactments and long-range commitments made in prior years, and by the sheer impossibility of reviewing the budget as a whole each year. In this context, Wildavsky argued, budgetary reforms, particularly those such as planning, programming, budgeting and zero-based budgeting, that aim to establish a mechanistic link between performance analysis and budget allocations inevitably will fail.
Still, recognizing the incontrovertible role of politics in performance management, the Bush administration entered its fi rst full budget cycle (the fi scal year 2003 budget) with a commitment of significant staff time to developing a credible performance rating tool and an invitation for wide-ranging public scrutiny of the fi rst PART questionnaire draft. According to Dull (2006) , early input from the GAO, congressional staff , and other experts and internal advisory committee members led the Bush administration to modify or cut questions viewed as ideologically motivated. Th e Bush administration also had to confront challenges inherent in assigning ratings to programs in a consistent way, including problems with subjective terminology in the questions, the restrictive yes/no format, multiple goals of programs, and a continuing lack of credible evidence on program results. A 2004 GAO study of the PART process reported that "OMB staff were not fully consistent in interpreting the guidance for complex PART questions and in defi ning acceptable measures," and program performance. In general, the study fi ndings show that some aspects of the quality of evidence submitted for PART reviews were signifi cantly and positively associated with the PART ratings, but not with changes in program funding received. Th e results suggest limited success of PART but also some promise for the Obama administration's eff orts to continue an emphasis on generating evidence of program results and using that evidence to increase support of programs that are "willing to test their mettle" (Orszag 2009 ).
Review of Related Literature
The Development and Implementation of PART Th e broad objectives of recent public management reforms to promote more eff ective, effi cient, and responsive government are not unlike those of reforms introduced more than a century ago (and reintroduced over time) (Heinrich 2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Radin 2000) . Active policy and research debates continue along with these waves of reform, Light suggests, because Congress, the executive branch, and public management scholars have yet to resolve, in the absence of suffi cient evidence one way or another, "when and where government can be trusted to perform well" (1998, 3) . Indeed, the focus on producing "evidence" of government performance has intensifi ed, in conjunction with the expansion of "evidence-based policy making"-that is, policies and practices based on scientifi cally rigorous evidence-beyond its longtime role in the medical fi eld (Sanderson 2003) .
Although major advances in our analytical tools and capacity for assembling performance information and scientifi c evidence have been achieved, we have yet to realize a consensus, either intellectually or politically, about what should count as evidence, who should produce it and how, and to what extent it should be used in public policy making and program management (Heinrich 2007) . A 2005 study by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO), for example, reported friction between the OMB and federal agencies regarding the diff erent purposes and time frames of PART and the GPRA and their "confl icting ideas about what to measure, how to measure it, and how to report program results," including disagreement in some cases over the appropriate unit of analysis (or how to defi ne a "program") for both budget analysis and program management (GAO 2005, 7) . Some agency offi cials saw PART's programby-program focus on performance measures as hampering their GPRA planning and reporting processes, and Radin (2006) noted that appropriations committees in Congress objected to the GPRA's concentration on performance outcomes and its deemphasis of information on processes and outputs.
Some analysts suggest that the development of PART was largely a response to the perceived failure of the GPRA to produce information on "what works" for guiding resource allocations and improving federal program performance (Dull 2006; Gilmour and Lewis 2006) . Lynn (1998) argued that an unintended eff ect of the GPRA was to focus managers' attention on the procedural requirements (or the paperwork) of the reform rather than using the information to improve results. Others see PART as a performance management tool that built on the underpinnings of the GPRA, including
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public's signifi cantly less positive view of federal program performance possibly suggests ignorance on their part of the performance information generated by PART or doubts of its veracity.
Th e same 2004 GAO report that criticized the early application of PART, however, also lauded PART for introducing greater structure into a previously informal process of performance review by asking performance-related questions in a systematic way. In its interviews with OMB managers and staff and agency offi cials, the GAO heard that PART also was contributing to richer discussions of what a program should be achieving and how it could be achieved, as it brought together program, planning, and budget staff s, including those outside the performance management area, to complete the questionnaire. At the same time, contrary to the intent of PART, some federal programs appeared in practice to largely ignore the requests for more scientifi cally rigorous evidence and quantitative information on performance outcomes. Gilmour and Lewis's (2006) analysis suggested that in the absence of acceptable performance information, the OMB made decisions on the basis of what they could rate, and in other cases, the fact that programs had high-quality measures did not appear to infl uence budget decisions.
Acknowledging the many reasons that poor program performance might not relate to budget outcomes, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) . Using the total PART score (and the change in the total score) as the key explanatory variable, Gilmour and Lewis reported positive statistically signifi cant relationships between increases in PART scores and proposed program budget increases. Decomposing the PART score into its four parts, however, they found no link between the performance results scores and program budgets. One possible explanation they set forth was that too many programs at this stage had inadequate measures of program performance. Th ey also suggested the importance of looking at the relationship between performance ratings and funding appropriations in future studies.
In a more recent study that included information on 973 programs, Norcross and Adamson (2008) analyzed data from the fi fth year of PART to examine whether Congress appeared to use PART scores in making funding decisions. In their analysis, they were able to look at programs that were rated more than once and programs with ratings that improved over time; approximately 88 percent of programs fi rst rated "results not demonstrated" subsequently improved their scores. Th eir analysis, based on simple cross-tabulations of PART ratings, proposed budget changes (the president's funding request), and congressional appropriations, suggested a tendency for the president to recommend funding increases for eff ective and moderately eff ective programs and decreases for ineff ective and results not demonstrated programs, and a corresponding (but weaker) inclination of Congress to award higher budget increases to eff ective and moderately eff ective programs.
While the Norcross and Adamson study was limited to a simple descriptive analysis, Blanchard (2008), who also used data from a that the staff were constrained by the limited evidence on program results provided by the programs (GAO 2004, 6 ). Among its recommendations, the GAO suggested that the OMB needed to clarify its expectations for the acceptability of output versus outcome measures and the timing of evaluation information and to better defi ne what counted as an "independent, quality evaluation." It also suggested that the OMB should communicate earlier in the PART process with congressional appropriators about what performance information is most important to them in evaluating programs. Th e OMB subsequently generated supporting materials to aid agencies and PART examiners in implementing PART, including a document titled "What Constitutes Strong Evidence of a Program's Eff ectiveness?" that described diff erent methods for producing credible evidence and the hierarchy among them in terms of their rigor.
3 By January 2009, the OMB and federal agencies had assessed the performance of 1,017 federal government programs, representing 98 percent of the federal budget. In a 2008 survey of senior federal managers, more than 90 percent reported that they were held accountable for their results (OPM 2008) . Th e OMB defi ned programs as "performing" if they had ratings of "eff ective," "moderately eff ective," or "adequate," with the last accounting showing that 80 percent of federal programs were performing. 4 Still, a November 2008 poll of the public indicated that only 27 percent of Americans gave a positive rating (good or excellent) of the performance of federal government departments and agencies. 5 Was PART really making a diff erence in how the federal government manages performance and, if so, in what ways?
Did PART Work?
In 2005, the OMB was honored with one of the prestigious Innovations in American Government Awards for the development of PART. Th e award's sponsor described the promising results that the OMB was achieving through PART, in particular, in encouraging more programs to focus on results.
6 Th e announcement noted that in 2004, 50 percent of federal programs reviewed by PART could not demonstrate whether they were having any impact (earning a "results not demonstrated" rating), while only one year later, only 30 percent of programs reviewed fell into this category. In addition, the percentage of programs rated eff ective or moderately eff ective increased from 30 percent in 2004 to 40 percent in 2005. In 2009, the OMB reported that 49 percent of programs were rated eff ective or moderately eff ective, while the number of programs with "results not demonstrated" had dropped to 17 percent. Only 3 percent of programs were reported to be ineff ective, and 2 of the 26 no longer were being funded. In addition, of 127 programs that initially were rated "results not demonstrated," 88 percent improved their scores in a subsequent evaluation (Norcross and Adamson 2008) .
Th ese trends in PART ratings appeared to suggest that federal government performance was improving, as was the capability of federal programs to marshal evidence in support of their eff ectiveness. Of course, this is predicated on one's belief that the rating tool was credible and that the evidence presented by programs during the reviews was of high quality and refl ected the achievement of federal program goals. Norcross and Adamson (2008) suggested that programs also could have been getting better at responding to procedural requirements associated with providing information to examiners or that the OMB could have relaxed its criteria. Th e the Department of Education in the total number of programs rated as not performing (ineff ective or results not demonstrated), and the percentage of programs not performing (27 percent) was above the average for all programs (20 percent). In addition, the substantive experience of the researchers involved in the assembly and coding of the data for this project lies in the area of social program evaluation. Th e intensive nature of the work undertaken to construct new measures for analysis and limited resources precluded its expansion to additional agencies. Th e PART data for these programs, including the overall program scores, the four section ratings, the ratings/responses to each question asked in each of the four sections of the PART questionnaire, and the weights assigned to the individual PART questions were downloaded from publicly available fi les or extracted directly from the published PART reports. Th e OMB continues to maintain a "Program Performance Archive" 8 where completed PART assessments, assessment details, and program funding levels can be accessed, along with all supporting documentation, including technical guidance letters that provided essential information for the construction of measures for this research. Th e OMB Web site also includes sample PART questions, and the exact set of questions asked in the review of each program can be viewed in the "view assessment details" link for each program. Th us, the core data for this project all can be readily accessed electronically without restrictions.
Th e assessment details from the OMB review of programs were used to construct new measures of the quality of methods and evidence supplied for the PART assessments by the sample of DHHS programs included in this study. Specifi cally, this information was analyzed by three researchers 9 to code and develop measures of:
• Th e types of information employed and reported by the programs-quantitative, both quantitative and qualitative/subjective information, qualitative/descriptive only, or none • Whether the programs were externally evaluated and/or whether internal data collection was used, and whether one or more comparisons were made to other programs • Documentation/evidence of the types of performance measures used by the agencies-long-term, annual, and whether a baseline and/or targets were established • Whether actual performance outcomes were reported A basic description of the coding of the PART data to construct the foregoing measures is included in the appendix, as well as descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Th e reviews involved reading the detailed comments, descriptions of measures, explanations of the ratings, and other documentation included in the PART reports. Th e review and coding of this information was completed by multiple researchers for each question asked in each of the four major sections of the PART.
Inter-rater reliability was very high in the data coding. Given that the coding to generate these new variables primarily involved assigning
results scores to budget proposals and appropriations. Looking at simple (increasing) correlations between results scores and changes in budget proposals and appropriations over time, Blanchard suggested that Congress was "easing its way into performance-based funding using the PART performance regime" (2008, 79) . Like Gilmour and Lewis (2006) , he acknowledged that it is not possible to fully model the political policy process of budgetary changes. Still, unlike Gilmour and Lewis, Blanchard found a positive relationship between PART results scores and congressional appropriations (as well as budget proposals) that was stronger and statistically signifi cant in fi scal year 2006, which confi rmed, he concluded, that Congress had "caught on" to how to use the PART results in budget decisions.
A 2008 GAO report alternatively suggested that there had been little progress in getting federal managers to use performance information in decision making. Based on the supposition that congressional "buy-in" to PART would be essential to its sustainability, Stalebrink and Frisco (2009) Based on their assessment of hearing report comments, they concluded that PART information rarely was applied in congressional budgetary allocation decisions.
Th is discussion motivates the central focus of this study: was credible, high-quality information being generated in response to PART that accurately refl ected program performance and progress toward program goals? And if so, was it infl uential in program decision making and in the allocation of budgetary resources? Alternatively, if the quality of information (and supporting documentation) on which program results were judged was weak, it presumably is not in the public interest for there to be direct, tight links between program performance ratings and programmatic or resource allocation decisions. In the next section, the data and methods used to test hypotheses about the relationships between the quality of evidence provided by agencies, their PART ratings, and the funding subsequently received by programs are described.
Study Data, Methods, and Research Hypotheses
Th is study focuses on the information submitted by 95 programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the PART process in the years [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Although the OMB reported 115 PART reviews for the DHHS at ExpectMore.gov, this number included the 2008 assessment of four programs 7 that came after this study sample was constructed, as well as reassessments of some programs. Th e DHHS was selected for this study in part because of some of the additional challenges that are well noted in the performance management and evidence-based policy making literature on measuring the outcomes of social programs (Heinrich 2007; Radin 2006) . Indeed, the DHHS is second only to Th is discussion motivates the central focus of this study: was credible, high-quality information being generated in response to PART that accurately refl ected program performance and progress toward program goals? Gilmour and Lewis (2006) argued that the fi rst three sections of PART, which are concerned with purpose, planning, and management, measure the extent to which federal programs produce the required paperwork under the GPRA. Th ey also noted that some of the questions regarding program purpose are open to politicization (contrary to an objective focus on results). Th us, I do not necessarily expect the same or as strong of a relationship between the quality of evidence and overall PART scores as between the rigor of evidence and the results (section 4) PART score.
Th e two core sets of explanatory variables include the newly constructed measures that describe the nature and quality of evidence provided by programs in the PART review, and the measures of other program and agency characteristics that are used as controls in the analysis. In accordance with OMB guidelines that defi ned what constitutes strong evidence (i.e., information produced through random assignment experiments and quasi-experimental or nonexperimental methods with matched comparison groups), 10 I expect higher ratings for programs that provide quantitative evidence, that are independently evaluated, and that report longer-term measures of outcomes and establish explicit performance targets. Th ese standards for strong evidence are applied in other contexts as well, such as by the U.S. Department of Education in its What Works Clearinghouse that was established in 2002 "to provide educators, policymakers, researchers, and the public with a central and trusted source of scientifi c evidence of what works in education" (see http:// www.whatworks.ed.gov/). Th e clearinghouse employs strict standards for evaluating program eff ectiveness, requiring a randomized trial, regression discontinuity methods, or a quasi-experiment (with equating of pretest diff erences) to meet evidence standards. Th is characterization is not intended to imply that qualitative evidence is always of inferior quality, but rather, it refl ects the guidelines established for judging performance in the examiner program reviews.
Th e specifi c research hypotheses tested (and corollary hypotheses) are as follows: H 1 : Th e PART results (section 4) score will be higher when more rigorous evidence is provided in support of the responses to the fi ve questions about program results. H 2 : Th e overall program PART score will be higher when more rigorous evidence in support of program results is provided and when higher-quality measures and evidence are provided in support of question responses throughout the questionnaire.
Th e same two corollary hypotheses apply in relation to overall PART scores, in addition to the following: 0 or 1 values, a simple measure of joint probability of agreement (taking into account the number of ratings but not accounting for the possibility of chance agreement) was computed. In the researcher coding of information for 25 questions and 95 programs, there were only three discrepancies (in coding an evaluation as external or internal), implying an inter-rater reliability rate of more than 99 percent.
In addition, the PART information and these newly constructed measures were merged with a data set assembled by Lee, Rainey, and Chun (2009) that provides additional information on characteristics of the agencies that might be relevant to program results and government funding decisions, including directive, goal, and evaluative ambiguity; congressional, presidential, and media salience; agency size, age, and fi nancial publicness; measures of professional staffing, managerial capacity, and other aspects of program governance; and policy and regulatory responsibilities. For example, Chun and Rainey (2005) discussed how ambiguity in organizational goals and directives and limitations in professional and managerial capacity contribute to challenges in specifying goals and measuring performance, making it more likely that public offi cials and managers will rely on measures of inputs, processes, and outputs rather than attempting to evaluate agency or program outcomes and impacts. In their study, they also found a relationship between fi nancial publicness and goal ambiguity and described tensions between political needs for goal ambiguity and goal clarifi cation that is critical to measuring performance outcomes. Th eir data were extracted from sources including the GPRA strategic plans, the Budget of the United States Government, Congressional Quarterly's Federal Regulatory Directory, and the Central Personnel Data File of the Offi ce of Personnel Management for a sample of 115 agencies, although only 15 of those agencies are represented among the programs included in this study.
Descriptive statistics of variables from this data set that were used as control variables in the analysis are also presented in the appendix, albeit with the limitation that they are measured at the agency rather than the program level. In addition, a number of these variables were highly intercorrelated, and thus their inclusion in models was determined in part by tests for multicollinearity. For example, we included only the congressional salience measure in the analysis, as variance infl ation factors exceeded acceptable levels when presidential salience also was included.
Th e primary method of empirical analysis employed in this study is multiple regression, with appropriate corrections for potential violations of basic model assumptions, (e.g., clustered robust standard errors to account for correlated errors attributable to programs grouped within agencies, changes in model specifi cation to correct for multicollinearity). Multiple regression models are estimated to test for positive associations between the rigor of evidence provided by programs and their PART scores, as well as between the rigor of evidence (and results scores) and the funding received by the programs, holding constant other program and agency characteristics.
Th e dependent variables in the analyses include (1) the program results (section 4) PART score, (2) the overall PART score assigned to the programs, and (3) the change in funding received from one fi scal year before the PART assessments to fi scal year 2008.
performance evaluation (and even may refl ect larger concerns about the eff ectiveness of programs).
Results of Hypothesis Testing
Th e fi rst hypothesis (and its corollaries), stating that the PART results score will be higher when more rigorous evidence is provided in support of the responses to the program results questions, was tested with the multiple regression model shown in table 1, column 1. Th e results of this regression, with the results (section 4) score as the dependent variable, generally confi rm the hypothesized relationships. Th e average results score is 0.419. For each results question for which no evidence is provided, the results score is reduced by 0.175 (p = .001), and for each question for which only qualitative evidence is off ered in response, the results score is reduced by 0.047 (p = .027); the reference category in this model is the provision of some quantitative evidence. And although statistically signifi cant only at α < 0.10, there is also a negative relationship between the reporting of internal evaluations as evidence and the results score. Th e relationship between the provision of external evidence and the results score is positive, as expected, but not statistically signifi cant.
Th ese fi ndings support the main hypothesis that the rigor of the evidence (or having at least some quantitative evidence) is positively associated with PART scores on the results section. Th at said, less than a third of the variation in the results scores is explained by these variables. In an alternative specifi cation, controls for the year in which the PART assessment was performed were added to account for the fact that the OMB clarifi ed its defi nitions and expectations for evidence quality over time. More than half of the programs in this study were assessed in 2002-2004 (prior to the GAO review of PART). However, these indicators are not statistically signifi cant (in this or subsequent models) and coeffi cient estimates of the key explanatory variables diff er by less than one-hundredth (0.01), suggesting that the relationship between the rigor of evidence and results scores did not change substantially over the study years.
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In model 2 in table 1, variables measuring program and agency characteristics are added to the model, and robust, clustered standard errors are estimated to adjust for the grouping of programs within agencies. Th e percentage of total variation in the PART results scores explained by this model almost doubles (to approximately 58 percent), and the statistically signifi cant, negative eff ects of having no evidence or only qualitative evidence in support of program performance hold. In addition, after removing the variable indicating the number of questions for which internal evidence was provided because of multicollinearity, the measure of the number of questions for which external evidence was provided is now also statistically signifi cant, suggesting that the results score increases by 0.045 for each question in this section that is supported by external evidence.
Th e results in model 2 also show that research and development and capital asset programs receive signifi cantly higher PART results scores. 12 Congressional salience (measured in Z-scores) is signifi cantly and positively associated with PART results scores as well, while the relationship of the age of the agency (the year in which it was established) to the results score is negative (and statistically significant). Although one readily might construct plausible arguments to explain why research and development programs such as the National C 2 : Overall PART scores will be higher for programs that use long-term measures of program outcomes, for programs that annually measure progress toward long-term goals, and for programs that establish baseline measures and targets for assessing performance.
Finally, taking into consideration prior research on PART and statements by former president Bush suggesting that better documentation of results was as important as improved performance, I test whether measures refl ecting higher-quality evidence provided to demonstrate program results are positively related to funding received by the programs. 
Data Analysis and Findings
Th e descriptive statistics in the appendix show what types of evidence programs are more and less likely to off er in response to the PART questions on program results. For example, it is clear that programs are least likely to provide externally generated evidence of their performance relative to long-term and annual performance goals (just 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively). Only in response to the question asking whether independent evaluations of suffi cient scope and quality indicate that the program is eff ective do a majority off er external evidence. At the same time, however, for 46 percent of the programs (most of those providing evidence), this evidence is only qualitative (no quantitative measures). In addition, close to half of the programs provided no evidence of how their performance compares to other government or private programs with similar objectives. On the positive side, more than 90 percent of programs report regularly collecting timely performance information, and more than 80 percent have identifi ed specifi c long-term performance measures focused on outcomes, although this does not imply anything about the quality of those measures or the evidence produced for evaluating program performance.
In coding the information supplied by programs for the PART assessment, information that described trends in outcomes without any specifi c numbers or data in support, such as "reduces incidences by around half," was coded as qualitative. In addition, supporting evidence that was contained in reports and documents from jointly funded programs, grantees or subgrantees, contractors, cost-sharing partners, and other government partners was coded as internal. Th e fi ndings that nearly half of the programs did not make comparisons to other programs with similar purposes and that the independent evaluations conducted generated mostly qualitative evidence on performance are not surprising, given that rigorous, large-scale evaluations of national programs are a costly undertaking. Some programs were awarded points for these questions by OMB examiners if they cited prior GAO reports, university studies, or evaluations by organizations such as the Urban Institute. However, these studies frequently are not initiated by the programs themselves, and thus, some programs may have had an advantage in these performance reviews that does not refl ect organizational eff orts to improve Th e second hypothesis and its corollaries ask whether providing more rigorous evidence in support of program results and in response to other questions throughout the questionnaire is positively related to the overall PART scores. As noted earlier, the fi rst three sections of the PART questionnaire are concerned less directly with program results and more focused on the process of measuring performance, and thus it is possible that the relationship between the quality or rigor of evidence and overall PART scores may be weaker. Th e same model as shown in table 1, column 1 (with measures of the rigor of evidence on results) was estimated with the overall PART score as the dependent variable, and the results are presented as model 3 in this table. Th e results of this estimation are comparable to those for the results section scores (model 1), although the magnitude of the coeffi cients diff ers because the scale of scores is diff erent. Th e average overall PART score is 1.87 (between ineff ective and adequate), and for each results question for which no evidence is provided, the overall PART score is reduced by Center for Health Statistics and those administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the National Institutes of Health might be better equipped to "demonstrate" progress toward achieving annual or long-term goals and cost-eff ectiveness, as well as capital asset programs administered by agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and the National Institutes of Health, it is more diffi cult to see the logic for a relationship between congressional salience and results scores. If it is the case that more politically salient programs and those with a higher percentage of fi nancial resources from government are more likely to have external (independent) evaluations mandated, then this might contribute to higher results scores. Regressions employing as dependent variables the raw scores from questions 1-3 in the results section (on demonstrating results), and separately, the raw scores from questions 4 and 5 (on comparing the program to other similar programs and the scope and quality of independent evaluations) both show statistically signifi cant associations between congressional salience and the results scores. Standard errors in parentheses; *coeffi cient statistically signifi cant at α < 0.10; **coeffi cient statistically signifi cant at α < 0.05.
0.567 (or about 30 percent of the average overall PART score). Th e provision of only qualitative results evidence is also negatively and statistically signifi cantly related to the overall PART score. About the same proportion of total variation in overall PART scores is explained by these variables (as in the model with the results scores as the dependent variable).
In the next model (model 4 in table 1), other measures of the program's performance management eff orts (based on PART questionnaire responses) were added to this model with the overall score as the dependent variable. Th ese include indicator variables for whether the programs were recorded as using long-term measures of program outcomes, annually measuring progress toward longterm goals, establishing baseline measures and targets for assessing performance, regularly collecting timely measures of performance, tying budget requests explicitly to their accomplishment of program goals, and holding federal managers and program partners accountable for performance results. After including these measures of performance management eff orts, the eff ects of the other measures characterizing the rigor of the results evidence are slightly weaker but still statistically signifi cant. 13 In addition, there are negative, statistically signifi cant relationships between overall PART scores and programs' reports of having no long-term measures, no baseline measures or targets, and no independent evaluations, while programs that report holding federal managers accountable and tying budget requests explicitly to results have signifi cantly higher overall PART scores. Not having long-term measures is most strongly (negatively) associated with overall PART scores (reducing the score by 0.803). Th at said, only 12 percent of programs presented externally generated evidence of these measures, and the percentages are even smaller for the other indicators of program performance management eff orts. Th us, although PART scores were probably based more on what programs reported they did to measure results than on objective reviews of the nature and rigor of the evidence supplied (as suggested by Gilmour and Lewis 2006) , the associations are at least consistent with the intent and expectations of the performance rating exercise.
In the fi fth model in table 1, agency characteristics are added to this same model as explanatory variables, and robust clustered standard errors are again estimated. Not having evidence in support of results or having only qualitative evidence are still negative and statistically signifi cant predictors of overall PART scores, as is the indicator for no long-term measures. In addition, holding federal managers accountable for program performance is still positively and signifi cantly related to overall PART scores. Among agency characteristics, the only variable statistically signifi cant at the α < 0.05 level is the measure of congressional salience, which is again positively to the PART ratings. Contrary to what one would expect, the percentage of agency positions that are classifi ed as management or program analysis-what Lee, Rainey, and Chun (2009) characterized as a measure of managerial capacity-is negatively related to overall PART scores, although only weakly. Indicators for the year in which the PART program was assessed (not shown) again did not add any explanatory power.
As discussed earlier, the "teeth" of PART (at least rhetorically) were supposed to be the budgetary consequences attached to the performance ratings, and the Bush administration emphasized that better documentation of results would be as important as high Th e only observed relationship consistent with the aims of PART is the negative relationship of agency evaluative ambiguity (the percentage of subjective or workload-oriented performance indicators, as opposed to objective and results-oriented performance indicators) to increases in funding. Th e other two statistically signifi cant associations with funding increases are agency size (the log of the number of full-time employees), which is negatively related to funding changes, and congressional salience, which is a strong, positive predictor of post-PART funding changes.
Th e fi nal two regression models explore the more basic relationship that has been investigated in prior studies of PART: are changes in funding related to program performance, as measured by the PART ratings (holding other agency and program characteristics and congressional salience constant)? As discussed earlier, previous studies generated mixed fi ndings on this question, with Gilmour and Lewis (2006) In each of these models, 56 percent to 58 percent of the total variation in program funding changes is explained, apparently primarily by agency characteristics (agency size, evaluative ambiguity, and congressional salience). In addition, indicator variables for the year the program was rated were not statistically signifi cant when added to the model (not shown in this table), off ering no support for Blanchard's suggestion that Congress became more eff ective at using PART results in its budget decisions over time.
Th e lack of an observed relationship between PART performance ratings and program funding changes and between the rigor of the evidence off ered in the PART assessments and program funding changes did not refl ect insuffi cient variation in funding from one fi scal year to another to detect these relationships. In all, 14 percent of the DHHS programs saw funding declines (by up to 100 percent, or a loss of all funding), and the others saw increases ranging from 0.5 percent to 44 percent. Approximately one-third of the programs realized funding changes (measured in millions of dollars) of ±10 percent or more. Simple descriptive statistics did show a positive correlation between PART results scores and overall PART scores and program rankings in terms of the size of funding increases they received, but these relationships were not statistically signifi cant.
As Moynihan (2008) noted, while OMB staff maintained that partisan preferences did not aff ect PART assessments, they did acknowledge their infl uence on resource allocations. Th is is expected, added Moynihan, given that the PART "explicitly feeds into the highly political budget process" (2008, 134) . In the analysis in this study of what predicts PART results and overall scores, as well as changes in federal funding, congressional salience was a consistent, statistically signifi cant predictor across the models. Indeed, even if the PART was objective in refl ecting the nature and quality of evidence on program performance in its ratings, one would be naive to expect the program ratings to have a direct or mechanical link to program funding, given the political nature of budget decisions and the many constraints imposed by limited information, long-range budget commitments, and reenactments on budgetary allocations.
Conclusion and Implications
Th e Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool sought to advance the promises of "results-oriented" government by strengthening the performance assessment process-that is, making it more rigorous, systematic, and transparent-and by directly linking the allocation of budgetary resources to the program PART ratings. Th e fi ndings of this study present a mixed review of PART's eff ectiveness. Th e empirical analysis using data on 95 Department of Health and Human Services programs with newly constructed measures to evaluate the quality and rigor of evidence supplied by the programs showed some consistent, statistically signifi cant relationships between the nature and rigor of the evidence and PART ratings, confi rming that programs that supplied only qualitative evidence (or no evidence) and that did not identify long-term or baseline measures for use in performance assessments were rated lower. Although the ratings of program results and the overall PART scores had no discernible consequences for program funding over time, the apparent seriousness with which evidence provided by the programs was evaluated is a positive step forward, particularly given the current administration's stated focus on "building rigorous evidence to drive policy" (Orszag 2009 ).
Th e Obama administration has made clear its intent to continue eff orts to strengthen program evaluative capacity, and it has signaled its commitment with an expansion of the Institute for Education Sciences and increases in evaluation budgets of federal agencies such as the Department of Labor and others (Orszag 2009 ity of these eff orts with the requirements of other performance management initiatives such as the GPRA to produce timely information for decision making. In the context of increasing public demands for accountability that include high-stakes pressures to demonstrate performance improvements, policy makers frequently have little choice but to consider and use a mix of diff erent types of information and methods in producing annual performance reports.
Th is, of course, begs another question: what other objective information and factors, besides program performance, should infl uence funding allocation decisions? For example, are there substantial, measurable factors that contribute to congressional salience that could be made more explicit or transparent in funding allocations? For purposes of accountability, the public should, at a minimum, understand how much infl uence program performance really has on funding decisions and what the trade-off s are between emphasizing performance and other goals, such as equity in access to public services. Although there are mechanisms such as televised hearings and other channels through which the public can ascertain some of this information, making the decision-making processes more transparent (that is, in an explicit and accessible way) and allowing for full disclosure, as President Obama has promised, would be another step forward. As Light's (1998) analysis suggests, while PART is now history, similar policy tools or reforms, even beyond the Obama administration's eff orts, surely will follow, as the public interest in seeing evidence of government performance is unlikely to abate anytime soon. 
